Identifying, Protecting and Preserving Individual Rights: Traditional   Federal Court Functions by Miner \u2756, Roger J
SETON HALL 
LAW REVIEW 
IDENTIFYING, PROTECTING AND PRESERVING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: TRADITIONAL FEDERAL 
COURT FUNCTIONS 
By 
ROGER J. MINER 
REPRINT 
Copyright © 1993 by 
Seton Han University, School of Law 





Identifying, Protecting and Preserving Individual 
Righis: Traditional Federal Court Functions ............ Honorable Roger J. Miner 
Settling Land Use Litigation While Honorable Richard S. Cohen 
Protecting the Public Interest: Honorable Douglas K. Wolfson 
Whose Lawsuit Is This Anyway? ................... Kathleen Mee/Jan DalCortivo 
Enforcing Environmental Indemnification 
Against a Settling Party Under CERCLA ........................ Daniel R. Aveiy 
Turning Back the Tide of Director and Theodore D. Moskowitz 
Officer Liability ............................................... Walter A. Effross 
Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal 
Revenue Code Provisions to Redress 
Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns Allan Karnes 
or Return Information ............................................. Roger Lirely 
Immunized Testimony and the Inevitable 
Discovery Doctrine: An Appropriate 
Transplant of the Exclusionary Rule Charles J. Walsh 
or an Excuse !or a Broken Promise? ........................ Steven R. Rowland 
COMMENT 
Protecting Tenants from Foreclosing Mortgagees: 
New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act in the Post-Gvttenberg Era 
NOTES 
First Amendment Prohibits Hale Crime Laws that Punish Only Fighting Words 
Based on Racial, Religious or Gender Animus 
Establishment Clause Prohibits State-Sponsored Invocations at Public School 
Graduation Ceremonies 
Abduction of a Defendant from Mexico at the Behest of the United States 
Government Does Not Defeat a Court's Jurisdiction Despite an Extradition 
Treaty between !he Two Nations 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibits a Criminal 
Defendant's Exercise of Racially Discriminatory Peremptory Chaiienges 
SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW JERSEY LAW 
SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECOND CIRCUIT LAW 
ESSAY 
The Judiciary's Role in Implementing the Mount Laurel Doctrine: 
Deference or Activism? ...................................... James E. McGuire 












Seton Hall University 
School of Law 
Newark, New Jersey 
VOLUME TWENTY-THREE 1993 NUMBER THREE 
IDENTIFYING, PROTECTING AND 
PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: 
TRADITIONAL FEDERAL COURT 
FUNCTIONS 
Honorable Roger]. Miner* 
As an employer of recent law school graduates and a some-
time teacher of law students, I have become a great admirer of 
the teaching and scholarship of the law professoriate. I have only 
a few criticisms that are applicable generally to the present-day 
work of those who have devoted their legal careers to scholarship 
and education. In an earlier article I noted that "new lawyers are 
less equipped to handle the demands of modem Jaw practice 
than those of a previous generation" as a consequence of "[t]he 
changing focus of academics, from doctrinal scholarship to inter-
disciplinary studies." 1 Indeed, law school curricula seem to be 
developing without much concern for real-world relevance. For 
example, I recently received a letter of recommendation from a 
professor who urged me to hire a student of his as a law clerk on 
the basis of the student's outstanding performance in a course 
called "Bloodfeuds." Although my court handles a rich variety 
of cases, we never have had one that would fit within that topical 
heading. Perhaps the professor thought that the course would be 
of interest to me in connection with my relations with my col-
leagues. In the same article, I placed at the door of academia the 
responsibility for the failure of recent law graduates "to obtain 
the oral and written skills of expression necessary for the survival 
of the profession. " 2 Law review articles and other writings by 
academics themselves often are so obscure as to be incompre-
hensible and therefore oflittle value to the bench and bar .. When 
academics talk only to each other, the rest of the profession 
suffers. 
I have noticed that recent law school graduates increasingly 
tend to discuss court decisions in terms of the perceived predilec-
tions of judges rather than on the basis of legal principles and 
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Adjunct Pro-
fessor, New York Law School. 
I Roger J. Miner, Confronting the Communication Crisis in the Legal Profession, 34 
N.Y.L. Seu. L. REV. I, 16 (1989). 
2 Id. 
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legal doctrine. This practice comes, as I understand it, from the 
inclination of most law professors to classify judges, particularly 
Supreme Court Justices, as "liberal," "conservative," "moder-
ate," "activist," etc., and to examine their decisions on the basis 
of such classifications. It seems to me that this approach is espe-
cially dangerous to legal analysis because: i) it leads law students 
away from a proper understanding of legal principles; ii) it im-
pedes the development of "think-like-a-lawyer" skills; and iii) it is 
valueless for predictive purposes, being based on the flawed 
premise that each judge has an ascertainable agenda. The pro-
fessoriate would do well to abandon this approach. 
"Public policy" is a response all too frequently given by 
young lawyers when asked to articulate the principles upon which 
a court decision is grounded. While public policy concerns 
should not be neglected in legal analysis, those who "profess" 
the law have an obligation to make their students aware that 
judges are guided by much more than public policy and that pre-
cedent, legal reasoning, rules of statutory interpretation, logic 
and stare decisis also merit study. Alison Reppy,3 who was Dean 
of my alma mater, New York Law School, during my student days 
frequently repeated the following: "Public policy is the wastebas-
ket of legal thinking." I proudly repeated that aphorism to a re-
cent graduate of a so-called "national" law school, and she 
commented as follows: "Isn't that strange? We were taught that 
legal reasoning is the wastebasket of public policy!" It seems to 
me that the modem legal education stew could do with a pinch 
less of "public policy" salt. 
Teachers of law hardly can be described as faddists. Most 
(especially those who are tenured) are free-spirited individualists, 
always ready to abandon the beaten path, to shed new light on 
old doctrine, to challenge conventional wisdom, to reinterpret 
received knowledge, to revise history and to pour new wine into 
old bottles (and drink it). They revel in their eccentricities, and 
this is all to the benefit of their students, their colleagues and the 
legal profession at large. And yet - despite their independence 
- law professors are all too receptive to fads. The current fad, 
universally accepted and demonstrated in numerous scholarly 
3 Still available from West Publishing Co. is a book co-authored by Dean Reppy 
and Joseph Koffler, another one of my professors. The book is entitled KOFFLER 
AND REPPY's HbRNBOOK ON CoMMON LAw PLEADING (1969). Who am I to complain 
about "Bloodfeuds"? I had to study '"Common Law Pleading.'" 
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wntmgs, is the use of the term "normative."4 The use of that 
term by academics has become so widespread as to be normative. 
I no longer know or care what the word means. It has evolved 
into so imprecise a word as to have no meaning at all for lawyers 
and judges. I do not care if I never see it again. 
This year I have received approximately 250 applications for 
the three clerkship positions available in my chambers. Each is 
accompanied by two or more letters of recommendation from 
law professors. A typical letter includes the following: 
Of the three hundred students in my contracts class, Ms. Smith 
achieved the third highest grade. She participated in class-
room discussions, and I spoke to her after class on at least two 
occasions. From these contacts, I have formed the conclusion 
that Ms. Smith would be the most outstanding law clerk ever 
to serve in any court anywhere at any time. If you desire fur-
ther information, do not hesitate to call me at the telephone 
number listed below. I am available in my office at the law 
school from 9:45 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. on the third Thursday of 
each month. 
If I never see another letter of this type, it would be too soon! 
Finally, and to the point of this Article, it is generally bruited 
about by the professoriate that the federal courts did not become 
concerned with individual rights until the twentieth century. Ac-
cording to common academic wisdom: "[t]he concern of the fram-
ers, especially the Federalists who fully supported the venture, was 
principally with creating a central government that would work and 
last, not with whether that government of limited powers would en-
gage in abuses of power. " 5 From this viewpoint, individual rights 
and the enforcement of those rights in the federal courts were not 
on the minds of the Framers. In the same vein, one author has writ-
ten as follows on the subject of "The Supreme Court and Individual 
Rights:" 
The Supreme Court's role as guardian of the rights and 
liberties of the individual is a new one, a responsibility as-
sumed in the twentieth century. 
For most of its history, the Court had little to say about 
the Constitution's guarantees of individual freedom. Preoccu-
pied with defining the relationship of nation to state, state to 
4 See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Competing Conceptions of Autonomy: A Reappraisal of the 
Basis of Tort Law, 67 TuL. L. REV. 347, 383-84 (1992). 
5 Stephen J. Wermiel, Rights in the Modern Era: Applying the Bill of Rights to the 
States, I WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.j. 121, 122 (1992). 
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state, and government to business, the Court found little occa-
sion and less reason to deal with individual rights. 
Indeed, until the twentieth century there was no broad 
constitutional basis for the assertion of individual rights 
against government action.6 
My purpose is to demonstrate that the original Constitution was 
concerned with individual rights, that the Bill of Rights gave even 
greater voice to this concern and that, from the beginning, the fed-
eral courts were deeply involved in identifying, protecting and pre-
serving individual constitutional rights. 
In writing the original Constitution, the Framers were indeed 
concerned with establishing a structure of government. They cer-
tainly were occupied with questions of separation of powers, of fed-
eralism and of commerce. But a close examination of the document 
itself demonstrates that the rights of individual citizens were very 
much on the minds of those who drafted the Charter. In the article 
dealing with legislative powers, the Constitution provides: "The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, un-
less when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it." 7 Another clause in the same article mandates that "No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. " 8 The same 
article imposes restrictions upon the States in respect of individual 
rights: "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto 
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "9 
Article III, the Judiciary Article, which extends the judicial 
power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority," 10 refers to individual rights 
in the following particulars: 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where 
the said Crimes shall have been committed .... 11 
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Con-
fession in open Court. 12 
... [N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
6 ELDER Wrrr, THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS I (2d ed. 1988). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
9 u .s. CONST. art. I, § I 0, cl. 1. 
10 U.S. CoNST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person 
attainted. 13 
825 
Included in Article IV are two very significant provisions pro-
tective of individual rights. The first provision demands that "[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Citizens in the several states." 14 The second provision in Ar-
ticle IV mandates that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... " 15 
It seems clear that the Framers intended the federal judiciary to 
enforce these rights. In discussing the importance of permanent · 
tenure for judges, Hamilton wrote: 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to 
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the ef-
fects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or 
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes dissemi-
nate among the people themselves, and which, though they 
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate 
reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dan-
gerous innovations in the government, and serious oppres-
sions of the minor party in the community. 16 
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispen-
sable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected 
from judges who hold their offices by a temporary 
commission. 17 
The provisions for individual rights and the constitutional guar-
antee of judicial independence clearly are interrelated. Judge Rich-
ard Posner, my colleague on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
once stated the proposition most succinctly: 
[I]t is hard to imagine why the framers of the Constitution 
would have bothered to give the federal judges such extraordi-
nary guarantees of independence if they had not expected 
them to be aggressive in protecting individual rights against 
encroachment by other branches of government - and plainly 
they did; and though the framers' thinking ran more to prop-
erty rights than to what we call civil liberties the constitutional 
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. 
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (emphasis added). 
17 Id. at 470-71 (emphasis added). 
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text is not so confined. 18 
An excellent example of the role played by the federal courts in 
the protection and enhancement of individual rights is found in the 
enforcement of the constitutional provisions prohibiting Congress 
or the state legislatures from passing bills of attainder. 19 According 
to the records of the Constitutional Convention, a unitary provision 
prohibiting ex post fa,cto laws as well as bills of attainder first was in-
troduced and debated.20 Interestingly, some delegates thought that 
a prohibition of ex post facto laws would be superfluous and were re-
luctant to support such a provision: 
Mr. Govr. Morris thought the precaution as to ex post facto 
laws unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder. 
Mr. Elseworth [sic] contended that there was no lawyer, 
no civilian who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of 
themselves. It cannot be necessary to prohibit them. 
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in the Constitu-
tion as to ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Con-
stitution - and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first 
principles of Legislation, or are constituting a Government 
which will be so. 21 
The records of the Convention revealed that before any further de-
bate was had on the ex post facto issue, "[t]he question [was] divided, 
[and] [t]he first part of the motion relating to bills of attainder was 
agreed to nem. contradicente. " 22 Although the ex post fa,cto provision, 
an important protection of individual rights, eventually was 
adopted, it is apparent that the Framers perceived a greater danger 
from legislative derelictions in regard to bills of attainder than from 
legislative derelictions in regard to ex post facto laws. An examination 
of the history of bills of attainder makes it clear why this was so. 
A sentence of death under the common law of England was said 
to fix a mark of infamy upon the person to be executed, who was 
"then called attaint, attinctus [or] stained."23 The consequences of 
this common law attainder were the forfeiture to the crown of the 
personal and real property of the attainted person and the "corrup-
tion of blood," which perforce forbade inheritance from ancestors 
18 Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. LJ. 1, 15-16 
(1983) (footnotes omitted). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
20 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375-76 (Max Far-
rand rev. ed. 1966.). 
21 Id. at 376. 
22 Id. 
23 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373. 
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and transmission of wealth and tides to heirs.24 Bills of attainder, 
being legislative enactments designed to inflict punishment without 
trial, are different from the common law attainder that followed a 
sentence of death following trial, and Blackstone recognized the sig-
nificant distinction between the two. 25 
First enacted by the English Parliament around the year 1300, 
bills of attainder originally were designed to ensure that dead trai-
tors' estates would escheat to the crown. 26 They later were used to 
punish those who engaged in a wide range of activities that were 
considered inimical to the interests of the crown.27 Bills of pains 
and penalties, also enacted by the English Parliament, were different 
from bills of attainder only in that they provided for punishments 
other than death.28 Unhappily, these English practices were im-
ported to colonial America.29 During the American Revolution, 
each of the thirteen colonies enacted bills of attainder or bills of 
pains and penalties directed at British loyalists. 30 Bills of attainder 
found their way into the laws of the new states, and the New York 
Constitution, adopted on April 20, 1777, was typical in that it pro-
hibited the state legislature from enacting bills of attainder but pro-
vided an exception "for crimes . . . committed before the 
termination of the present war."31 Approximately sixty pieces of at-
tainder legislation were enacted in New York between the Declara-
tion of Independence and the 1783 Treaty of Peace.32 Among these 
was the Attainder Act of October 22, 1779, under which fifty-nine 
New York citizens were subjected to the forfeiture of their property 
•• Id. at •381. 
25 As Blackstone noted: 
As for acts of parliament to attaint particular persons of treason or 
felony. or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or contrary to the 
common law, co serve a special purpose, I speak not of the·m; being to 
all intents and purposes new laws, made pro :re no.ta, and by no means 
an execution of such as are already in being. 
Id. at •256. 
26 Michael P. Lehmann. Tiu Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of the Decisional law, 
5 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q 767. 772 (1978); Note. Bills of Attainder and tlu Supreme Court 
in 1960 - Flemming v. Nestor, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q 402, 403. 
27 Comment, Tiu Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of 
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE LJ. 330, 331 (1962). 
28 Id. 
29 Alison Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New Yark. 23 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. I, 3-4 
(1948). 
30 Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by tlu Court, 63 CORNELL L. 
REV. 355, 376-79 (1978). 
31 Qyoted in Reppy, supra note 29. at 19. 
32 See id. at 17-35. 
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as a consequence of being attainted. 33 In Virginia, Thomas Jeffer-
son himself, while serving in the legislature of that state in 1778, 
participated in the adoption of legislation to attaint one Josiah Phil-
lips for "hav[ing] levied war against the Commonwealth."34 
It is clear that the Framers recognized the evils inherent in bills 
of attainder. James Madison wrote that "[b ]ills of attainder ... are 
contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every 
principle of sound legislation."35 Quoting Montesquieu, he noted 
the principal reason for prohibiting bills of attainder: "Again: 'Were 
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty 
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge 
would then be the legislator.' " 36 There was some ambivalence in the 
courts about enforcing the Bill of Attainder Clauses in the early 
years of the Republic, however, because the bills enacted at the time 
of the Revolution were designed to attaint the hated British loyalists 
and to confiscate their property. For example, in Cooper v. Telfair, 37 
the Court refused to declare that a 1782 act of the Georgia legisla-
ture attainting British loyalists was void. (It will be remembered 
that the Constitution prohibited states as well as the federal govern-
ment from enacting bills of attainder.) Each Justice who partici-
pated in the Cooper decision wrote a separate opinion, but the 
opinion of Justice Samuel Chase expressed the common denomina-
tor: "There is ... a material difference between laws passed by the 
individual states, during the revolution, and laws passed subse-
quently to the organization of the federal constitution. Few of the 
revolutionary acts would stand the rigorous tests now applied 
•..• "
38 Clearly, the Court had a problem with bills of attainder 
passed during the Revolutionary War. 
The significant protections afforded by the Bill of Attainder 
Clauses eventually found full expression in the cases involving the 
so-called "test oath" statutes that were the product of the Civil War. 
On the same day in 1867, the Supreme Court decided two cases 
involving test oaths that clarified bill of attainder jurisprudence and, 
in doing so, struck an important blow for individual rights. In Cum-
mings v. Missouri,39 the Court examined a provision of the Missouri 
33 Id. at 22. 
34 Thomas Jefferson, Bill to Attaint Josiah Phillips (May 28, 1778), reprinted in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 345, 345 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
35 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison). 
36 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison). 
37 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800). 
38 Id. at 19. 
39 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 227 (1867). 
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State Constitution declaring it a criminal offense for a Catholic 
priest to engage in his priestly duties without complying with the 
Missouri constitutional requirement that he swear under oath that 
he did not support the Confederacy. Finding the state constitution 
in conflict with the Federal Constitution's Bill of Attainder Clause, 
which had been read broadly to prohibit bills of pains and penalties 
as well as bills of attainder, the Supreme Court noted that theinten-
tion of the clause was "that the rights of the citizen should be secure 
against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under 
any form, however disguised."40 Similarly, in Ex parte Garland,41 the 
Court found that an act of Congress prohibiting any person who 
would.not swear that he had not supported the Confederacy from 
holding public office or practicing law contravened the Bill of At-
tainder Clause. In both cases, the Court performed a traditional 
federal court function by giving life and meaning to a constitutional 
right. 
Continuing to identify the Bill of Attainder Clause as an impor-
tant individual right worthy of protection and preservation, the 
Supreme Court in 1946 invalidated a statute that foreclosed the pay-
ment of salaries to three federal employees said to be "subver-
sive."42 The Court there noted that individuals need not be 
targeted by name because the Constitution forbids any legislation, 
"no matter what [its] form, that appl[ies] either to named individu-
als or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to 
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial."43 In 1965 the 
Court overturned legislation that barred certain Communist Party 
members from labor union employment.44 The Court once again 
warned against a cramped definition of punishment for bill of attain-
der purposes and reiterated its "emphatic[] reject[ion] [of] the argu-
ment that the constitutional prohibition outlawed only a certain 
class of legislatively imposed penalties. "45 
Ultimately, the Court defined punishment for bill of attainder 
purposes in terms of three tests to be applied to challenged legisla-
tion, an affirmative answer to any one of the tests being sufficient to 
meet the definition: "(l) whether the challenged [act] falls within 
the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the 
[act] 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, 
40 id. at 325. 
41 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
4 2 Set United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
43 id. at 315. 
44 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
45 id. at 447-48. 
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reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes'; 
and (3) whether the legislative record 'evinces a congressional in-
tent to punish.' "46 And so the courts, in the great common law 
tradition, gave shape and substance to the stark verbiage of the orig-
inal constitutional provision prohibiting the passing of bills of at-
tainder by: i) expanding the Bill of Attainder Clauses to include the 
prohibition of pains and penalties; ii) extending protections to 
members of named groups as well as named individuals; and iii) ex-
plicating the meaning of punishment for bill of attainder purposes. 
Beginning in the aftermath of the American Revolution and contin-
uing throughout American history up to the present, bill of attain-
der jurisprudence has evolved as the federal courts have performed 
their traditional functions in relation to individual rights.47 Each 
court decision in this area, including those discussed above, stands 
as a separate argument to contradict the widely-held opinion that 
"[t]he seeming [sic] individual liberties contained in the body of the 
Constitution ... were inserted into the federal Constitution because 
they were necessary for a federal structure, not as an assurance of 
rights considered fundamental or crucial to human happiness or 
fulfillment. "48 
The story of the adoption of the Bill of Rights need not be re-
peated at length here. Suffice it to say that Madison, although origi-
nally opposed to a so-called declaration of rights, eventually came 
around to favor it and, in fact, became its author.49 The Federalists, 
supporters of the Constitution in its original form, thought that a 
national bill of rights was unnecessary because i) the Constitution 
created a limited government and was not a threat to individual 
rights; ii) an attempt to specify rights could be harmful because cer-
tain important rights that were not listed might be considered un-
protected; iii) a national bill of rights might reflect the "lowest 
common denominator" of the rights considered important by the 
individual states; and iv) a bill of rights might imply certain powers 
in the federal government that were not intended.50 Added to this, 
46 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 
852 (1984) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473, 475-
76, 478 (1977)). 
47 See, e.g., In re Extradition of McMullen, Nos. 91-2402, 2420 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 
1993) (in bane) (majority and dissenting opinions). 
48 WILLlAM E. NELSON & ROBERT c. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNJ'IY: CONSTI-
TUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 88 (1987). 
49 David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and 
Pragmatic Constitutional lnterpretivism,. 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 119, 131-37 (1991). 
50 Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF Rrs. J. 
115, 117 (1992). 
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of course, would be the argument that the rights considered most 
fundamental already were included in the original Constitution. 
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, saw the omission of a bill 
of rights as a basis for defeating the Constitution and urged the citi-
zenry to demand additional constitutional provisions for individual 
rights. 51 The ratification conventions of the states urged adoption 
of certain individual rights amendments, and the First Congress 
submitted twelve amendments to the states for ratification in 1789. 
Ten of the amendments were ratified by the states by 1791 and be-
came the Bill of Rights. 52 What does need repeating here, in sup-
port of the theme of this Article, is the following statement made on 
June 8, 1789 by James Madison during the debate in the House of 
Representatives on the Bill of Rights amendments: 
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar man-
ner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable 
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or 
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroach-
ment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution 
by the declaration of rights. 53 
This statement may have had its genesis in a letter dated March 15, 
1789 sent by Thomas Jefferson to Madison from Paris expressing 
support for the proposed declaration of rights: 
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit 
one which has great weight with me, the legal check which it 
puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if 
rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own depart-
ment merits great confidence for their learning and 
integrity. 54 
Both Jefferson and Madison correctly foresaw that the individual 
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights would find their primary 
source of protection in. the federal courts. 
Besides adopting the constitutional amendments known as the 
Bill of Rights, the First Congress adopted an enduring piece of leg-
islation officially titled: "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of 
the United States."55 This legislation frequently has been referred 
51 Id. at I 16. 
52 ld. at I 18. 
53 Quoted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY 1031 (1971). 
54 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, I 789), in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659, 659 Uulian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
55 Ch. 20. 1 Stat. 73 (I 789). 
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to as the Judiciary Act of 1789 or the First Judiciary Act, and it es-
tablished a three-level system of national courts that has continued, 
with various changes related to the jurisdiction and functions of the 
courts, to the present day.56 There can be little doubt of the interre-
lationship between the Bill of Rights and the First Judiciary Act. 
Both were adopted with an eye to Anti-Federalist objections to the 
lack of specificity in the Judiciary Article of the Constitution as well 
as to the omission of a declaration of rights in the original Charter. 57 
Accordingly, a number of rights in the Bill of Rights had to do with 
the judiciary: i) the requirement of a grand jury indictment;58 ii) the 
prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination;59 iii) 
the requirement of due process;00 in criminal cases, the rights to a 
speedy and public trial by jury in the vicinage of the crime,61 com-
pulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses, 62 and assistance of 
counsel;63 iv) the right to trial by jury in suits at common law and a 
restriction on the reexamination of facts so tried;64 and v) the 
prohibitions against excessive bail and cruel and inhuman punish-
ment.65 The complementary jurisdiction conferred upon each of 
the three tiers of the new federal judicial system in civil and criminal 
cases by the Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly evinced the intent of the 
First Congress to establish "independent tribunals of justice" as 
"guardians of [the bill of] rights."66 
It was not until 1833, in a case titled Barron v. The Mayor and City 
Counsel of Baltimore61 that the Supreme Court decided that the Bill of 
Rights applied only to the national government and did not restrict 
state authority. The holding arose in the context of a claim by the 
plaintiff that the City of Baltimore had rendered his wharf useless by 
causing the deposit of large amounts of sand and earth to be made 
56 See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 30-49 (3d ed. 1988) (tracing the evolution of the federal 
court system). 
57 Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, Tiu judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise 
or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERALjuDICIARY 13, 29 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 1992); see also WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THEjUDICI-
ARY ACT OF 1789, at 21 (1990). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
59 Id. 
6() Id. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
66 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
67 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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near the wharf. The water adjacent to the wharf thereby became too 
shallow for the berthing of most vessels and Barron sought recovery 
on a claim of deprivation of property without due process, in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Chief justice Marshall saw the issue as 
one "of great importance, but not of much difficulty,"68 and sent the 
matter olfby reasoning that the amendments were not explicitly made 
applicable to the states: 
[If] the framers of these amendments intended them to be lim-
itations on the powers of the State governments they would 
have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and 
have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the 
extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the 
several States by affording the people additional protection 
from the exercise of power by their own governments in mat-
ters which concerned themselves alone, they would have de-
clared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.69 
There are those who question whether the issue was as lacking 
in difficulty as the Court perceived it to be. Professor Gerald Gun-
ther, for example, 
[n]ote[s] that a different inference might b~ drawn from the 
text of the Bill of Rights: the First Amendment explicitly inhib-
its "Congress" (but has been read to apply to the entire na-
tional government); the Seventh Amendment is explicitly 
addressed to "any Court of the United States"; but all of the 
other Bill of Rights provisions speak in general terms. And a 
few courts, before Barron, thought those provisions generally 
applicable. 70 
As will be seen, it was not until the courts seized upon the Four-
teenth Amendment that the Bill of Rights would be considered to 
protect against state action. Until then, however, the courts would 
continue to identify, protect and preserve individual rights against 
adverse action by the federal government as specifically provided in 
the original Constitution as well as in the Bill of Rights. 
It often escapes notice that the celebrated case establishing the 
power of the federal courts to review legislative acts was all about 
the enforcement of individual rights. In Marbury v. Madison,71 Wil-
liam Marbury and three others sought mandamus to compel the de-
livery of commissions evidencing appointment as justices of the 
68 Id. at 247. 
69 Id. at 250. 
70 GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS·ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 82 (3d ed. 1981). 
71 5 U.S (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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peace for the District of Columbia. Although the Court concluded 
that Congress was without constitutional authority to confer original 
mandamus jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, a history-making 
decision establishing the power of judicial review, the Court made it 
dear that Marbury and the others were entitled to the delivery of the 
commissions, which had been signed by the President and sealed by 
the Secretary of State. Although the Supreme Court was the wrong 
place to go for the relief sought, Chief Justice Marshall acknowl-
edged the role of the courts in the enforcement and protection of 
the rights of the citizenry: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right ef every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of gov-
ernment is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the King 
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he 
never fails to comply with the judgment of his court. 72 
.... The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the 
rights ef individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or execu-
tive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. 73 
It is generally accepted that the Framers intended the federal 
courts to have the power of judicial review, despite the lack of a 
specific provision in the Constitution. According to Hamilton, limi-
tations on legislative authority 
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the 
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare 
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution 
void. 74 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov-
ince of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be re-
garded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore 
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the mean-
ing of any particular act proceeding from the legislative 
body.75 
Federal court power to review state laws also has served as an im-
portant protection for individual rights. In Fletcher v. Peck, 76 one of 
the earliest cases to assert the power, the Supreme Court invali-
72 Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 170 (emphasis added). 
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton). 
75 Id. at 467. For further historical support for the intentions of the framers in 
regard to judicial review, see George S. Brown, The Supreme Court's Duty to Defend the 
Constitution, 14 WASH. L. REV. 202 (1939). 
76 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
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dated a Georgia statute that purported to annul certain conveyances 
ofland supposed to have been made corruptly by the state to private 
persons. The Court there enforced the rights of a good faith pur-
chaser, determining that the state law impaired the obligation of 
contracts within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitu-
tion. fletcher came to the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the 
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. 77 
A later case invalidating a state statute, Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee,'8 came to the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the Court 
of Appeals of the State of Virginia. Martin was a British citizen who 
asserted a claim to land in Virginia under a line of title going back to 
the days before the Revolutionary War. Hunter claimed title as the 
beneficiary of state laws confiscating the lands of British subjects 
and parceling them out to the citizens of Virginia. Martin claimed 
protection under a federal treaty, but the Virginia Courts rejected 
his argument. In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court had reversed 
a Virginia Court of Appeals' ruling against Martin and remanded for 
the entry of judgment in his favor.'9 The Supreme Court deter-
mined on appeal that Martin's title was secured by the treaty and 
that the state law was subordinate to federal treaties under the 
Supremacy Clause.80 On remand, the Virginia Court refused to rec-
ognize the determination of the Supreme Court, finding not only 
that the case should have been decided differently under state law 
but that the Supreme Court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction 
over cases decided in state courts. The Supreme Court, of course, 
rejected both contentions. 
In deciding Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Supreme Court re-
ferred specifically to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 
25 provided for Supreme Court review of decisions of the highest 
court in a state: (i) where a state court declares invalid a treaty or 
statute or an act under the authority of the United States; (ii) where 
a state court declares valid a state statute or an act authorized by the 
state over a claim of invalidity grounded in the Constitution or laws 
77 Id. at 87. 
78 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
79 See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 628 (1813). 
80 The Supremacy Clause provides that: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 835 1992-1993 
836 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:821 
of the United States; and (iii) where a state court decides against a 
right, title, exemption or privilege claimed by a party under any 
clause of the Constitution or under a federal treaty or statute, or 
under a commission held under the authority of the United States. 
According to the Supreme Court in Martin: 
[T]he 25th section of the judiciary act, which authorizes the 
exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases, by a writ of 
error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution 
It is an historical fact that at the time when the judiciary 
act was submitted to the deliberations of the first Congress, 
composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and 
ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing, 
supporting, or opposing that constitution, the same exposition -
was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the 
opponents of that system. It is an historical fact ... that no 
state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the sub-
ject, or declined to obey the mandate of the Supreme Court, 
until the present occasion. 81 
Section 25 also provided some support for the power to review 
the constitutionality of federal laws. Certainly, where a state court 
declared a federal statute or treaty invalid on federal constitutional 
grounds, and the Supreme Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction 
under section 25, the Supreme Court would perforce review the 
constitutionality of the federal statute. Although the power of judi-
cial review is firmly established, and although it has played, and con-
tinues to play, an essential role in the protection of individual rights, 
there are those who regard it as a judicial usurpation, unauthorized 
by the Constitution or its historical antecedents. The following 
statement, included in a unanimous Supreme Court decision issued 
in 1958, has been the target of much criticism: "[Marbury v. Madiwn] 
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has 
ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma-
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. "82 
Those who object to this characterization speak to the duty of the 
executive and legislative branches to exercise their own judgments 
as to constitutionality.83 The debate goes on.84 It is, however, a 
most futile debate, because the concept of judicial review long has 
81 See Martin, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 351-52. 
82 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958). 
83 See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13-15 (6th ed. 
1986). 
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been accepted in its present form by the nation's citizens, who con-
sider it essential to the protection of the rights they cherish. 85 
The Civil War was fought over individual rights and, in its after-
math, the federal courts of necessity became more extensively in-
volved in protecting the individual rights of the citizenry. Even 
during the war, individual rights clashed with presidential power, 
when President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and 
established martial law in an area not involved in active military op-
erations. 86 Individual rights prevailed when the Supreme Court ul-
timately held that martial law "can never be applied ... where the 
courts are open and their process unobstructed."87 It was the Four-
teenth Amendment, however, that enlarged the individual rights 
that the federal courts could enforce against the states. The second 
of the three new constitutional amendments proposed by the 
Reconstruction Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified 
in 1868. Its language invited the courts to identify the rights of 
United States citizens and to protect those rights against state. 
encroachments: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.88 
The federal courts were quick to accept the invitation, and the rule 
of Barron v. Baltimore89 eventually would fall by the wayside as the 
Supreme Court determined that most of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights were incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Adding to the expansion of the role of the fed-
eral courts in the enforcement of individual rights was the vesting of 
general federal question jurisdiction upon the lower courts in 
1875.90 
84 See generally WHO SPEAKS FoR THE CoNsTrnJII<?N? THE DEBATE OVER INTER-
PRETIVE AUTHORITI Qohn W. Brewer ed., 1992). 
85 For a critical, Depression-era examination of the application of the power of 
judicial review in regard to civil liberties, see generally Osmond K. Fraenkel,judicial 
Review and Civil liberties, 6 BROOK. L. REv. 409 (1937). I think that the historical 
overview included in the article supports my contention that the Supreme Court 
has made extensive use of judicial review in the protection of individual rights. 
86 Article One, Section nine, Clause two of the Constitution provides: "The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 
87 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). 
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
89 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
90 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
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At first, the Supreme Court enforced various rights enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights on the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment 
itself and without referring to the Bill of Rights.91 In an 1897 case, 
for example, the Coun dealt with the requirement for just compen-
sation in eminent domain takings on the basis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment 
provision.92 It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court first im-
ported a right from the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states. The im-
ported right was the free speech guaranty of the First Amend-
ment. 93 Other rights similarly were imported, and the federal 
courts vigorously pursued their duty to enforce them. By 1934, 
some perceived that the federal courts had changed functions to the 
extent that their primary function had become the enforcement of 
the Bill of Rights. As one commentator noted: 
[T]he Bill of Rights seems about to become the most impor-
tant part of the Constitution. To it alone may the individual 
appeal against the action of executives, boards and commis-
sions, which sometimes by a single stroke of the pen attempt 
to abolish the rights once deemed sacrosanct. It is his sole 
refuge against the tyranny of the majority which that acute and 
sympathetic critic of our institutions, Lord Bryce, once said 
would become our greatest danger - a tyranny which Ed-
mund Burke declared is greater than the tyranny of a monarch 
because it is a multiplied tyranny. But of this Bill of Rights the 
Federal Courts are the natural guardians.94 
This author went on to indicate that the "lower Federal Courts" 
could perform their functions in regard to the Bill of Rights "only if 
their power is constantly expanded and their prestige maintained 
undimmed. " 95 
The question of what provisions of the Bill of Rights were in-
tended to be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
answered by the Supreme Court with tests grounded in generalities, 
including: i) whether the provision in question is so fundamental as 
to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;"96 ii) whether to 
ignore the right is to violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
91 jOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411 (2d ed. 1983). 
92 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
93 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
94 Walter P. Armstrong, The Changing Function of the Federal Courts, 20 A.B.A. J. 
441, 443 (1934). 
95 Id. 
96 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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mental;"97 and iii} whether the provision is "fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice."98 In any event, the Supreme Court 
has applied to the states over the years most of the provisions of the 
first eight amendments. The unincorporated provisions include: the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms; the Third Amendment pro-
hibition on the quartering of troops in private homes; the Fifth 
Amendment requirement of indictment by grand jury; the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and the Eighth 
Amendment protections against excessive fines and bail. 99 The de-
bate continues over the question of the incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights and whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
ally intended the Bill of Rights to be enforced against the states. 100 
That debate also is a futile one, as even Robert Bork concedes: "The 
controversy over the legitimacy of incorporation continues to this 
day, although as a matter of judicial practice the issue is settled." 101 
The Tenth Amendment, of course, could never be applied as a 
restriction on the states, inasmuch as it provides that "[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." 102 The Ninth Amendment is quite another thing, how-
ever, even though it never has been applied to restrict the states 
from infringing any individual rights. The Amendment declares that 
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." 103 
It will be remembered that one of the arguments against a na-
tional Bill of Rights was based on the notion that rights not specified 
might be considered unprotected against the depredations of the 
federal government. It seems certain that the Ninth Amendment 
was proposed to meet that argument. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 104 
Justice Goldberg concluded that the Ninth Amendment authorized 
the courts to identify rights not specified in the Constitution, by re-
lying on "the traditions and conscience" 105 of the citizenry. Accord-
97 Id. 
98 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
99 Wenniel, supra note 5, at 129. 
100 See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Book Review, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 296 (l 987); Michael 
Zuckert, The Fourteenth Amendmeut and the Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 149 
(1991) (book review). 
IOI ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMFTING OF AMERICA 94 (1990). 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
104 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
105 Id. at 487 (Goldberg,]., concurring). 
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ingly, the Justice found in the Ninth Amendment a right of privacy. 
His formulation was a vague one, and the Ninth Amendment has 
faded into obscurity as far the federal courts are concerned. There 
are those who argue that the Ninth Amendment meant little or 
nothing in the first place, 106 and there are others who argue that the 
Ninth Amendment merely serves to direct the federal courts "to 
adopt a broad view and liberal construction of the first eight amend-
ments and to regard the personal liberties enumerated there as de-
serving the most meticulous, fastidious, and expansive 
protection." 107 There are few who give the Ninth Amendment the 
sweeping construction given by Justice Goldberg. I predict that a 
future Supreme Court will reassess the Ninth Amendment in con-
nection with the identification of unenumerated rights. 
The identification and enforcement by the federal courts of in-
dividual rights not listed in the Constitution have given rise to bitter 
debates over the years. 108 What is certain is that courts have identi-
fied and enforced certain fundamental rights not explicitly provided 
for in the Constitution: freedom of association; voting and participa-
tion in the electoral process; interstate travel; fairness in the crimi-
nal process; privacy; and "fairness in procedures concerning 
individual claims against governmental deprivations of life, liberty, 
or property." 109 The references to life, liberty and property in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments surely provide some basis for the 
identification of the foregoing fundamental, albeit unlisted, rights. 
The problem has been to define what is meant by "fundamental," a 
vague and ambiguous term at best in this context. As one commen-
tator has observed, "[o]ver the past half-century.jurists and scholars 
have sought to derive these fundamental values from a variety of 
sources, including natural law, tradition, the judge's own values, 
neutral principles, reason, and society's 'widely shared' values." 110 
The sources all are properly the subject of criticism, and many of 
the arguments against allowing the courts to identify nonexplicit 
rights ring true. The concern over judicial overreaching is not with-
out foundation. And yet, this debate also has reached the futile 
stage, at least as to the nonexplicit rights already ratified as funda-
106 See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hick Behind the Fourth, and 
Plead the Fifth, But What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Ca1.-KENT 
L. REV. 239 (1988). 
107 See Morris S. Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64 
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 265, 268 (1988) (emphasis added). 
108 NowAK ET AL., supra note 91, at 459. 
109 Id. at 460. 
110 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Gcvemmental Interests: An Essential Bui 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 925 (1988). 
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mental. Simply put, the citizenry never will allow those rights to be 
taken away. 
An example of the identification of a unenumerated right is the 
application of the Due Process Clause to establish the defense of 
outrageous governmental conduct in the investigation of crime. An 
outgrowth of the defense of entrapment, this defense originally was 
suggested by the Supreme Court by way of dictum in United States v. 
Russell. 111 In that case, the Court observed that there might one day 
arise a situation "in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is 
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction 
•••• "
112 In a later case, Hampton v. United States, 113 in which both the 
entrapment and due process defenses were rejected, the Supreme 
Court specifically recognized the availability of a defense based on 
outrageous governmental conduct. Although the Supreme Court 
never has sustained the defense, the lower courts have developed 
and applied the concept of governmental overreaching and govern-
mental misconduct as a due process defense in criminal prosecu-
tions and, in some cases, have sustained the defense. 114 The lower 
federal courts continue to work through the cases in an attempt to 
arrive at a proper definition of the defense. 115 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently remanded to the district court for further 
exploration of the issue a case involving the use of a sexual relation-
ship by an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration to further 
his investigation of a woman who ultimately was charged with con-
spiracy to traffic in narcotics. 116 The work of the courts in identify-
ing and enforcing the rights of the people against outrageous 
111 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
112 Id. at 431-32. 
113 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (no due process 
violation); United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.) (defendant has stand-
ing to challenge outrageousness of Government's conduct on due process 
grounds), vacated sub nom., United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.) (no due process violation), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 
1978) (outrageous Government conduct violates due process); United States v. 
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 
(2d Cir. 1973) (same); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(same). 
115 See Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Du. Process and the Law 
Enforcement justification, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 74 7 (1992) ("propos[ing] a 
methodology for utilizing the law enforcement justification to define the contours 
of the due process defense"). 
116 See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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governmental conduct is merely a continuation of the work begun 
over two centuries ago. 
Joseph Story wrote: "In every well organized government, 
therefore, with reference to the security both of public rights and 
private rights, it is indispensable, that there should be a judicial de-
partment to ascertain, and decide rights . . . . " 117 Since the very 
beginning of the Republic, the federal courts have been engaged in 
the enterprise of ascertaining and deciding rights. Beginning with 
the few rights enumerated in the original Constitution, including in-
dividual property rights, and continuing with the Bill of Rights and 
the various unenumerated rights that have been identified, the fed-
eral courts have performed their assigned tasks of protecting and 
preserving individual rights. These tasks were not suddenly under-
taken in the twentieth century but have grown and evolved over the 
years. Reflecting the desires of the American people themselves, 
the courts have found ways and means to expand the individual 
rights that all Americans take as their birthright. As Professor Abra-
ham so cogently has put it: "[N]o other agency or institution of the 
United States government has proved itself either so capable of per-
forming, or so willing to undertake, the necessary role of guardian 
of our basic rights as the judicial branch." 118 
There are a number of reasons why the federal courts have 
been so capable of performing their duties as guardians of the rights 
of the people. 119 An important reason, according to Nadine Stros-
sen, is that their "insulation from the political sphere ensures that 
federal courts should be able to enforce the rights of even unpopu-
lar individuals and minority groups." 120 Whatever the reason, the 
work is being done, as it has been done for two hundred years, and 
the federal courts are performing their assigned function of "pro-
tect[ing] individual civil liberties against encroachment by either 
federal or state govemment." 121 I think that I have demonstrated 
that it is incorrect to say that the "entry of the Supreme Court in 
modem times into the review of infringements of civil liberties ... 
began about 1925." 122 I think that I also have demonstrated that 
117 JOSEPH STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 818, at 582 (Carolina Academic Press photo. reprint 1987) (abr. ed. 1833). 
118 HENRY j. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 24 (4th ed. 1982). 
119 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federali.st View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers 
of FederaljurisdictW1l, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 235 (1985). 
120 Nadine Strossen, The Supreme Court's Rol.e: Guarantor of Individual and Minority 
Group Rights, 26U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 467 (1992). 
121 Tom C. Clark, The Court and Its Functions, 34 ALB. L. REV. 497, 501 (1970). 
122 John P. Frank, The Historic Rol.eofthe Supreme Court, 48 Kv. LJ. 26, 32 (1959). 
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the identification, protection and preservation of individual rights 
has been the result of an evolutionary process - for the federal 
courts and for the nation's citizens as well. 123 
Finally, I take note of a question that I often put to my law stu-
dents on the first day of class: "Who has the final say about the 
United States Constitution?" Too many answer: "The federal 
courts.'' 
123 See generally ]oHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE C1v1L RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD 
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (!988). 
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